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Consensual Merger as a Means of State
Succession and its Relation to Treaty
Obligations
by Ronald J. Klein*
I. INTRODUCTION
M ODERN DAY STATES have become increasingly affected by
various nation's implementation of social, economic, and military
aid and subsequent regulation. As a result, maintenance of internationally
agreed upon rights and obligations has become a vital goal, achievement
of which should be sought through daily intergovernmental contact. This
need for international stability has been threatened by the accelerated
rate of state succession. The twentieth century has witnessed consecutive
decolonization and self-determination efforts fostered by various nation-
ality groups. Each time a state succession occurs, the new state exhibits a
completely new identity. This factor raises the question of how interna-
tional relations can progress without a guarantee of bilateral or multilat-
eral compliance with established rights.
This note will examine some of the various forms of state succession,
with particular emphasis on consensual merger. In addition, the analysis
will specifically examine successor states' treaty rights in relation to cus-
tomary international law and the newly drafted Vienna Convention on
the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.1 The United Arab Repub-
lic (U.A.R.), a past consensual merger between Egypt and Syria, will be
used as an example for the purpose of analysis throughout the note. The
U.A.R., which was established in 1958 with the intent of creating a pan-
Arab empire, has been the most successful of the many Mideast merger
attempts and will therefore serve as a helpful model.2
*Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. candidate (1982).
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 80/31, as corrected by A/CONF. 80/31 Corr. 2 of October 27, 1978, reprinted in 17
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1488 (1978).
2 Since the aborted attempt by Nasser to form a pan Arab state, a large number of
other mergers have been set up and have failed. They are: Iraq and Jordan from February,
1958 to July, 1958; the United Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Yemen, which was never
implemented; Egypt, Syria, and Iraq in April, 1963 also never implemented; Egypt and Iraq
in May, 1964 and Egypt and Yemen in July, 1964, neither of which were ever put into effect;
Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Syria reached an accord in April, 1971, but it too was annulled;
Libya and Egypt in August, 1972 also failed; Libya and Tunisia in January, 1974 was never
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II. STATE SUCCESSION AND ITS VARIATIONS
The term succession of states is commonly used to describe the
evolution of a state into a new or already established sovereign containing
an increased or diminished land mass.8 Personal unions, real unions, fed-
erations, confederations and consensual mergers are but a few of the cata-
lysts through which state succession occurs." Personal unions exist when
states are independent, self-governing entities, but linked by the same
ceremonial leader or ruler.' A modern example of this form is the aggre-
gate of Commonwealth countries under the British crown. Both Canada
and Australia, although separate states, owe allegiance to the crown of
England because of their common historical tradition. Alternatively, real
unions consist of two or more states possessing an interwined governmen-
tal structure. The states share a leader, and many of their institutions are
merged to deal as a single unit at the international level.7 For example,
the Austria-Hungary empire, during the years 1867 to 1918, was ruled by
a monarchical leader. However, the two states maintained separate legis-
latures which were required to grant authority for the states to act
jointly.8
A confederation exists when two or more states remain separate and
independent, but aggregate under a common central body to which they
acted upon; North Yemen and South Yemen in March, 1977 was negotiated upon, but never
agreed to; Libya and Syria in November, 1980 also reached an accord, but detailed arrange-
ments were never developed; and finally most recently, a merger between Libya and Chad
was announced at the beginning of 1981. The list of attempted mergers illustrates that most
recently Libya, under the erratic direction of Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi, has become the
new catalyst for 'alleged' Middle East unity. Qaddafi, a self styled protege of Nasser, sees
himself at the helm of the empire he is trying to forge. His latest activity was a military
invasion of neighboring Chad which he claims wants to merge with Libya. The consequences
of his actions will be for future international law to categorize. But it seems, to this writer,
that the Chad connection may be more accurately termed an annexation, or anchlfiss, in-
stead of a consensual merger.
3 D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 155-157 (2d ed. 1976).
4 J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 290-295 (1979).
6 Id. at 290.
6 The Commonwealth is a voluntary grouping of states formerly under British rule.
Some commentators declare that the Commonwealth is a personal union under the British
monarchy, while others believe that it is a loose association of states. Either way, each state
is wholly independent of the crown and possesses its own foreign and domestic policies.
Whatever the interrelationship of the Commonwealth countries, all will agree that the states
are tied to the crown which is the focal point of their historical heritage. See R. WILSON,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY COMMONWEALTH ISSUES 3-6 (1971).
J. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 290.
8 Identical military and economic programs had to receive approval from both the Aus-
trian and Hungarian legislative bodies before the Union could act. See [1956] YEARBOOK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 404 (United Nations).
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delegate certain limited powers.' As a whole the local units retain interna-
tional acceptance as individual entities. The European Economic Com-
munity, which unites Western Europe and beyond, is an example of a
successful economic confederation. On the other hand, the necessary ele-
ments of a federation are: "(1) division of powers between the central and
regional governments, (2) a certain degree of independence between the
central and regional governments, (3) direct action on the people by the
central and regional governments, and (4) some means of preserving the
Constitutional division of power."1 0 The central or federal government
usually retains complete authority over foreign policy. In other words, an
individual component of a federation cannot represent or bind the entire
federation under a treaty. One scholar, Dr. James A. Crawford, explicitly
requires a fifth criterion, that the central government's powers include
jurisdiction over all foreign affairs, as well as autonomous authority inte-
grating aspects of the local states internal policies."' By stipulating this
element, more structure is added to the federated unit. The United States
is a working example of this theory in practice.
In addition, there is consensual merger, consisting of two or more
states having separate international personalities united under a common
Constitution, with a common head of state competent to represent them
in their relations with other states.12 This type of unification is one in
which both states negotiate on at least semi-equal terms to form a succes-
sor state. Subsequent to negotiations a plebiscite may be conducted in
the predecessor states to assure that the merging is voluntarily accepted
by the people, not just the governments. Approval is indicated by an af-
firmative vote by a majority of the citizenry.' s
As shall be pointed out later in this note, numerous factors are used
to classify a state as being in one of the above forms. Among the charac-
teristics which make one type of state more appropriate than another are
land mass, culture, history, and population. The various combinations of
BERNIER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 5 (1973).
o These criteria are flexible enough to encompass any number of diverse government
structures. The United States distinguishes between federations and confederations as fol-
lows: A federation is able to act with direct effect on the citizenry, while the governing unit
in a confederation is only able to act upon the state as an entity. Today, unlike the U.S.,
most of the international community uses a less rigid test looking instead to the degree of
control to differentiate between the two terms. See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 291-292.
" J. CRAWFORD, supra note 4 at 292.
" As will be discussed later in this note, there are different theories which aid in the
determination of how the successor state stands in relation to other states under customary
international law. There is a possibility of conflict if the successor state terminates all pred-
ecessor obligations, while the third party state interprets the situation as merely a con-
tinuity of the state and thus maintenance of all responsibilities. See 1 D. O'CONNELL, STATE
SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1967).
's S. WAMBAUGH, A MONOGRAPH ON PLEBISCITES 31 (1920).
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criteria cause each evolution of succession to be treated differently.
III. THEORETICAL APPROACH TO STATE SUCCESSION
It is important to make a distinction between complete state succes-
sion and other abbreviated forms of succession. Complete state succes-
sion, which is the extinction of a predecessor state and the formation of a
new one, entails the position that the successor state's obligations to
maintain previous rights and obligations maybe altered or terminated.1 '
Other types of succession indicate mere continuity of the predecessor
state since the personality of the state usually remains the same.15
Customary international law and international judicial decisions have
not created a standard test to make such a determination, which has
made this area one of longstanding confusion. It has been suggested that
if certain individual segments of a state, such as population, land mass, or
legal order are eliminated, replaced, or substantially altered, then the old
state ceases to exist." The tangible elements of readjustment of citizens
or territory are simple concepts to grasp, but the term "legal order" is
unclear. What are the term's requirements: coup d'6tat, creation of a new
constitution, modification of legislative, administrative, or judicial
branches, or alteration of class structure? Each of these criteria on its
own is not sufficiently complete to aid in the determination of whether
there has been a complete state succession, but they may be helpful, if
added to the overall pool of probative characteristics.
Professor Kelson believes that if a state has lost control of the effec-
tiveness of its legal order, particularly in its influence and representation
in international law, then it may be subject to extinction as a state in its
present form.'8 However, his standard is not universally applicable. For
example, when two states merge a new legal culture may temporarily re-
place the old one, but when the merger terminates, an automatic rever-
sion to the previous political and legal environment occurs. 9 The Syria-
14 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 6.
J. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 74-76, 404-406.
Shifts in population or territory may be exemplified by a natural climatic or geophys-
ical disaster which submerges an island state and wipes out its population. This is an exam-
ple of a state becoming extinct, even if a new population subsequently migrates into the
territory. See P. FAUCHILLE, TRAIrT DE DROlT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 373 (1922), reprinted
in K. MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1968).
See also J. CRAWFORD, supra note 4 at 36-48; cf. R. CRANE, THE STATE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1907).
17 Each of these elements will be dealt with individually in section III of this note.
1S H. KELSON, GENERAL THEORY, 220, reprinted in K. MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY
OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1968).
" The same criticism applies to many of the different forms of state succession. For
example, a state which is conquered or annexed, such as Austria was in 1938, may lose all
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Egypt merger is a case in point. Syria's legal order was totally displaced
by the formation of the U.A.R. in 1958. However, upon its dissolution in
1961 Syria's pre-unification international status returned."'
Raestad, another theorist, advocates a test based on whether third
party nations recognize the subjugation of the state, and will therefore
adhere to representations by the successor state.2 1 This proposal also con-
tains serious flaws. The main problem is the lack of a consistent interna-
tional pattern in recognization of a new state, because each country's
standard is based on its own strategic interests.2 2 For instance, if a Com-
munist state falls victim to a revolution and a democratic leader rises to
lead the nation, the Western bloc states would probably recognize it as a
new state so as to release it from obligations to the Communist bloc. Si-
multaneously, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' led Eastern bloc
states would probably charge the United States with intervention and
meddling in the domestic affairs of other states, and would indignantly
only recognize the 'new' state in its predecessor form. All in all, there has
been no consistent international view on whether a new government has
taken over, versus a new state foundation formed. As a result, Raestad's
views are not conclusory but may be added to the list of characteristics to
determine a particular state's status.
Another school of thought lists two formalized rules of state con-
tinuity: territorial change and internal revolution."' Territorial gain or
loss, the better secured of the two cannons, does not affect the interna-
tional status of states.24 Strong historical policy supports this rule. Practi-
cally speaking, the international community profits by maintaining the
status quo, because preserving the balance of power between any number
of states will not be jeopardized by a state's gain or loss of territory which
was part of a negotiated agreement. Internal judicial bodies of many
traces of its legal/political system during the occupation. But once the conqueror, Nazi Ger-
many, surrendered, Austria internationally proclaimed it once again was the same state as
before World War II. The state merely picked up where it left off with regard to treaty
obligations with third party states. R. LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 115 (1944),
reprinted in J. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 310. See also Austrian State Treaty of 1955, 49
U.N.T.S. 747; 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (1922).
20 0. UDOKANG, SUCCESSION OF NEW STATES TO INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 294-296 (1972).
21 A. RAESTAD, LA CESSATION DES ETATS D'APRPS LE DROIT DES GENS 449 (1939), reprinted
in K. MAREK, supra note 18, at 8.
2 K. MAREK, supra note 18 at 8.
23 D. ANZILOTTI, LA FORMAZIONE DEL REGNO D' ITALIA NEI RIQUARDI DEL DIVITTO INTERNA-
ZIONALE 9 (1912), reprinted in K. MAREK, supra note 18, at 15.
24 The bottom line concern is to preserve and protect any bilateral or multilateral
agreement that had been painstakingly negotiated and ratified by the respective states. If
every time a state changed its physical size, whether by coercive or noncoercive means, it
could unilaterally disclaim a past agreement, international law would be useless.
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states, throughout history, have affirmed this policy.25 For example, the
German Supreme Court, on August 13, 1923, announced that, "A state
continues to exist as such even though large portions of its territory are
taken from it."'s More recently the Harvard Draft Convention on the
Law of Treaties stated, "A change in the territorial domain of a state,
whether by addition or loss of territory, does not, in general, deprive the
state of rights or relieve it of obligations under a treaty, unless the execu-
tion of the treaty becomes impossible as the result of the change. '' s2
The second traditional canon regards revolutionary changes within
the state. Because of the same concern for international stability, changes
of government, whether they are accomplished by a substitution of lead-
ers, political parties, or any other structural modifications, usually are
held to be a continuity of the original state. The main focus revolves
around the extent of the revolution." A revolution might involve com-
plete economic, political, and social change, but the question which is im-
portant to the continuity issue is the procedural manner in which the
change occurred. The international legal community must look to see if
the revolutionary changes were brought about under conditions which
potentially violate the prescribed procedure of revisions."
As stated above, international judicial decisions by the courts of vari-
ous states have attempted to uphold state continuity at all cost. One of
the most famous cases, respected and adhered to internationally, was de-
cided by the United States Supreme Court in 1871. The case, The Sap-
phire,0 dealt with a sea collision between a French vessel, the Euryale,
and an American ship, the Sapphire. The suit was filed in a United States
court in the name of Napoleon III, as owner of the Euryale, but by the
time the case was litigated the Emperor had been overthrown. The issue
naturally was whether the suit became moot because the party seeking
11 See Lazard Brothers and Company v. Midland Bank, ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES (A.D.) 1931-1932, Case no. 69 (Great Britain); Roselius
and Company v. Dr. Karsten and the Turkish Republic intervening, A.D. 1925-1926, case
no. 26 (Amsterdam); In re Ungarische Kriegsprodukten Aktiengesellschaft, A.D. 1919-1922,
case no. 45 (Switzerland).
"e FONTES, Ser. A, Sectio II, Thomus 1, Pg. 29 (1923), reprinted in K. MAREK, supra
note 18, at 17.
1 Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (Supp. No. 4) 662 (1935).
21 K. MAEK, supra note 18, at 25-26.
2 A revolution's legality does not wholly depend upon the amount of material change
that occurs, or how much violence is involved. The real question pertains to the quantity
and quality of the legal order that is retained. For example, much of the Code Napoleon,
which was drawn up during the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte III, was sustained even after
the Emperor's second dethroning. The change in French sovereigns was regarded merely as
a succession of states, not a succession of governments, in part as a result of legal stability.
30 The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164 (1870).
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damages was no longer in existence. The court, in a historic judgment,
stated:
We think it has not. Napoleon was the owner of the Euryale, not as an
individual, but as sovereign of France. . .. On his deposition the sover-
eignty does not change, but merely the person or persons in whom it
resides . . . . The reigning emperor, or National Assembly, or other ac-
tual person or party in power is but the agent and representative of na-
tional sovereignty. A change in such representative works no change in
the national sovereignty or its rights.8'
The Sapphire represents the longstanding view of the United States that
governments may change but the continuity of ones sovereignty stays the
same. Napoleon's political downfall provided the U.S. court with an op-
portunity to dismiss the case, thereby protecting an American citizen
from liability. But the Justices, realizing the importance of reasonable re-
liance on international responsibility, opted for an approach which would
maintain the court's own international integrity, as well as promote the
general importance of international law.
In 1936, the Institute of International Law met and resolved that
each individual case of potential state successions must be measured in
its own right, and that caution must be exercised to prevent a hasty or
quick determination. 2 It must be remembered that a predecessor state's
existence may potentially be maintained throughout a period of substan-
tial disruption. Therefore, any decision must be tempered to the situation
at hand, and only after a careful and thorough investigation should a de-
cision by international bodies or states be made.8
The importance of the determination of continuity of sovereignty
with regard to succession of states directly affects international agree-
ments and treaty obligations. Thus, the next section deals with the theo-
ries and practices which make up present customary international treaty
law.
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF A SUCCESSOR STATE'S TREATY
RESPONSIBILITIES
The twentieth century has seen a host of radical to moderate political
upheavals. An examination of the history of the law of state succession
31 Id. at 168.
88 The Institute submitted that it'is more of a hindrance, to the international determi-
nation of succession, to lay down rigid rules of succession than if general guidelines are
created with the flexibility to be modified if certain circumstances arise. See II ANNUAIRE DE
L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 212 (1936), as reprinted in K. MAREK, supra note 18, at
8-9.
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will further an understanding of the international law which was applied
to the environment surrounding the unification of Egypt and Syria.
The succession discussed in this section only applies to succession of
states, not succession of governments. It is often difficult to determine
which of the two alternatives has occurred and as a result there is sub-
stantial international confusion whenever any type of succession takes
place. A full state succession occurs when a distinct political and juridical
entity emerges from the rubble of one or more predecessor states.3 4 Addi-
tional characteristics of full state succession may include, but are not
limited to, the afore mentioned new political leader or coup. However,
these factors alone, usually indicate merely a change in governments. 8
State succession, as we know it today, can be traced back to the era
of the Roman empire (510 B.C. to 535 A.D.).3 6 At that time, when a state
ceased to exist because of conquest, merger, federation, or annexation, the
succession of states was treated analagously to the death of an individ-
ual.37 All responsibilities and obligations of the predecessor state were
handed down, ipso jure, to the successor state. In other words, the re-
spective rights and duties followed by way of traditional inheritance law
and derived from absolute natural rights carried on continuously regard-
less of the identity of the bearer.38 This theory is known as universal suc-
cession and was adhered to until the middle of the nineteenth century. At
that time communication between states and regions greatly improved,
resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of international treaties
and obligations. Nations began to view the universal theory as over sim-
plistic and therefore not realistic enough to deal with the modern inter-
twined world.39
34 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 11.
5 J. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 402-406.
36 H. GROTluS, ON THE LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, Book II, Chap. XVI, § XVII (1846)
(translation by Francis Kelsey, 1925); See also S. PUFFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND
NATIONS, Book VIII, Chap. XII, Para. 11 (1729) (translation by Basil Kennett).
37 Note, Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: The Vienna Convention of 1978,
19 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 886 (1978).
38 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 9.
11 Before the era of the industrial revolution, constructive communication between
states was in its infancy. Trade was the major catalyst for whatever agreements were estab-
lished. It was therefore easy for nation-states to assume their predecessor state's obligations
because there were very few that carried over. In addition, a lack of organized international
law made enforcement of any such agreements non-existent.
The nineteenth century, however, saw a marked increase in international reliance be-
tween states. Transportation was greatly improved and the need for raw materials and food
made ongoing trade relations between states of vital interest to all parties concerned. As a
result, the need for an international legal system, which could be practically applied to state
succession, became an important international objective. See, Succession of States in Re-
spect of Treaties; supra note 37, at 887.
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Searching for a new theory, Professor Arthur Keith developed the
concept of negativism. This theory also relied on the idea that interna-
tional obligations were directly tied into personal obligations. However,
the result was the opposite to that of the universal theory. Negativists,
drawing an analogy from contract law, believed that treaties terminated
upon complete succession of states. 41 When an individual contracted to
perform personal services for another such that only he could fulfill the
obligations, the contract would be declared void if he died or became in-
capacitated. Similarly, if a state no longer existed, its successor state
could not respond to its predecessor's commitment since the successor
state probably could not adequately substitute that particular service.
The dispositive theory modifies the negative/nullification theory. 2
This particular type of treaty fixes boundaries, creates easements, or gen-
erally sets aside natural rights which are considered to have a permanent
and enduring character.' The basis for these exceptional agreements is
purely respect for an acquired right which goes beyond any change in
government or state. An example is the treaty establishing the U.S. naval
base at Guant6namo Bay, Cuba." It is apparent that even though Cas-
tro's Cuba and the U.S. government are at odds politically, and Castro
has made occasional demands that the United States withdraw from the
military base, the Cuban government has never attempted, militarily, to
reclaim the base and the United States has not taken the issue
seriously.'
5
The U.S. Canal Zone in Panama, until recently, was another exam-
ple. This land mass was considered property of the United States even
though it intruded on the physical sovereignty of Panama. All subsequent
40 A. KEITH, THE THEORY OF STATE SUCCESSION 17 (1907); C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 118 (1924), reprinted in Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra note 37, at
887.
41 SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT OF TREATIES, supra note 37, at 888.
41 E. DEVATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAWS, Book I, Intro-
duction, § 25 (1758), reprinted in Note, Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra
note 37, at 888.
43 E. DEVATTEL, supra note 42, at § 25.
" The treaty gave the United States Navy a perpetual lease to the bay area. According
to its terms the United States possessed this right until such time as it unilaterally aban-
dons the facility. Treaty of Relations with Cuba, signed May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1682, T.S.
866.
", On September 26, 1961, Fidel Castro, in a speech before the U.N., stated that he
intended to use the international legal system to remove the U.S. base at Guant6namo Bay.
Similarly, in 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crises, Castro attempted to thrust
himself into the international spotlight by once again demanding U.S. withdrawal from the
base. Both times the United States did not bother to respond, and Castro did not push the
issue at the international level. M. HALPERIN, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF FIDEL CASTRO 81
(1972).
1981
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governments since the canal was built have abided by the U.S. sovereign
right over the territory as set forth in the original treaty for construction
of the canal in 1904.
46
The universal succession and negativism theories have given way to
modern varieties of treaty law. The first, is a descendant of the universal
succession theory, and advocates assumption of all the prior state's trea-
ties by the newly formed state. A fear that world lawlessness will occur if
changes of sovereignty are constantly abrogating established treaties
leads commentators who maintain support of this theory to urge its adop-
tion for the maintenance of world order.47 This approach is not uncom-
mon in today's modern world. For example, many of the new states that
have emerged since World War II have been conversions from former col-
onies under British, French, Portugese, or Spanish rule. The only signifi-
cant change in the succession of many of these states is the right to self
rule, as opposed to foreign imposed rule; while other characteristics of the
states remain the same. Therefore, it can be argued, that since they, as
pieces of the world puzzle, maintain a synonymous presence as their for-
mer colony status, they should assume all their established responsibili-
ties at the international level.' 8
A second, new approach to treaty law is a modernized neo-negativist
theory.' Since succession of states is a matter of policy, not law, there is
a great deal of conflict regarding the premise that states succeed to the
obligations of their predecessors. The controversy arises for two reasons:
(1) there is no succinct body of international law of state succession
which successor states must follow as a result of international agreement,
and (2) political and economical realities of successor states prevent com-
, Article 24 of the 1903 Convention between Panama and the United States providing
for construction of a ship canal stated: "No change either in the government or in the laws
and treaties of the Republic of Panama shall, without the consent of the United States,
affect any right of the U.S. under the present convention or under any treaty stipulation
between the two countries that now exists or may hereafter exist touching the subject mat-
ter of this convention. Convention on Isthmian Canal, signed Nov. 18, 1903, United States-
Panama, Art. 24, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. 431.
The Canal Zone, as this region has been known, was a U.S. territory governed under
U.S. law and protected by its military personnel. On September 7, 1977, a treaty was signed
between the United States and Panama whereby the Canal Zone, along with all buildings
and assets, was to be turned over to Panama free of charge. This treaty extends until 12/31/
99. See A. NORMAN, THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES OF 1977: A POLITICAL EVALUATION 20-47
(1978).
41 D. O'CONNELL, INDEPENDENCE AND PROBLEMS OF STATE SUCCESSION reprinted in
O'BRm.N, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 7 (1965); K. Keith, Succession to
Bilateral Treaties by Seceding States, 61 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 521 (1967).
48 G. Verbit, State Succession in the New Nations, [1966] PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
120.
"q A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 601 (2d ed. 1961).
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plete enforcement of various obligations of the previous sovereign."
Therefore, the new negativist attitudes rely on a practical assessment of
state succession. As Professor O'Connell articulately stated:
a treaty with elaborate machinery for performance by the predecessor
state is not as a matter of pure construction susceptible to performance
by it's successor ..... The conclusion that most treaties do not devolve
upon successor states, is a conclusion yielded by the ordinary law of trea-
ties that looks to the effective fulfillment of the parties' inten-
tions-intentions ordinarily frustrated by a change of sovereignty.5 1
As a result, a treaty cannot be artificially binding upon a party which
had no part in its origin, and does not possess the personal means to
enforce it. This new negativist theory, to the extent that many treaties
operate on a principle of Rebus sic stantibus,5s has a great deal of merit
to it. New states, formed by a merger, generally want to enter the interna-
tional society of states on reasonable terms. Denouncing all previous trea-
ties is not a self-serving alternative because most established states will
subsequently view the successor state with low credibility and little good
will.
The third modern concept is a two option compromise based on the
traditional theories. These options take into consideration the interest of
the old, established states which demand stability through succession of
treaties, while protecting the emerging states which do not want to be
burdened with obligations inconsistent with their new political and eco-
nomic policies.
The first option focuses upon the differences between dispositive
treaties and ordinary treaties and attempts to identify criteria which
would help new states to determine whether a treaty should survive a
change of sovereignty. Some commentators feel that law making treaties,
such as transit rights, fishing boundaries, and water rights-treaties which
advance the growth of international law and order are dispositively ori-
ented and should transcend sovereignty because they reflect a trans-
national body of opinion.58
60 This concept is particularly true with respect to states which succeeded from colonial
backgrounds. These states came into existence wary of any international law or norm which
would require them to perpetuate policies of their former colonial masters. Verbit, supra
note 48, at 122.
1 D. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 15 (1956); D. O'CONNELL, supra note
47, at 14.
" The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus literally means, "in these circumstances." When
applied to the devolution of treaties it mandates the validity of carryover treaties, so long as
there are no material changes in the relevant facts and circumstances that would make per-
formance of the agreement an inequitable responsibility. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1139 (5th
ed. 1979); Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra note 37, at 893.
63 Jenks, State Succession in Respect of Law Making Treaties, [19521 BR. Y. B. INT'L
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The second option has been labelled the Nyerere approach, after the
Prime Minister of Tanganyika who theorized it." This option calls for a
unilateral statement from the successor state that all treaties binding
upon the predecessor government will remain in effect for two years be-
yond the independence date. During this period each agreement is reeval-
uated for its consistency with current national goals. Those treaties which
the government wishes to maintain are continued and prospectively re-
negotiated, while the balance of treaties are terminated after the grace
period. This approach interjects rationality into a critical decision by al-
lowing the new state to make in depth studies and careful choices regard-
ing the respective treaties.
In general, the above principles apply to both bilateral and multilat-
eral treaties. Yet there has been a stronger trend of continuity with re-
spect to multilateral agreements since there are many parties at stake."
In each case, the successor state must look to the provisions and policies
of the convention of which the predecessor state was a signatory. Usually
the Secretary General of the United Nations is the depository for most of
the conventions. Following the state succession he presents the new state
with a list of treaties to which the predecessor state was a party and terri-
torially bound. He then requests affirmance by the successor state as to
which treaties it considers to still be in force.56
This polarization of theories has pitted the newly formed third world
states against the old established states. Whereas the states that have
been in existence for some period of time realize the importance of long
term obligations, the newly evolved states simply see such responsibility
as burdensome in their attempts to establish domestic credibility. These
two opposing viewpoints must be resolved in order to solidify interna-
tional law.
V. CONSENSUAL MERGER AS PRACTICED IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The region of the world where most attempted unifications have
taken place is the Middle East. Over the centuries many Middle East
leaders have attempted to unify the various states into an all inclusive
republic. The major obstacle has been that some states want complete
L. 105 (1952); La Forest, Towards a Reformulation of the Law of State Succession, [1966]
PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 103 (1966), reprinted in Note, Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties, supra note 37, at 894.
8, J. Nyerere, Problems of State Succession in Africa: Statement of the Prime Minis-
ter of Tanganyika, 11 INT'L & CoMP. LAW QUARTERLY 1210 (1962).
65 2 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 229
(1967).
56 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, THE EFFECT OF INDEPENDENCE ON TREATIES 170-190
(1965).
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unification, while others are only interested in a confederation
government.
In 1945, as a result of a reawakening of a need for Arab unity, the
Arab League was founded. 7 It was made up of almost all of the existing
Arab states and its purpose was to unite the Arab nations both economi-
cally and militarily. Though the philosophy of the Arab League remains,
few of its policies were ever implemented. In the mid 1950s, Col. Gamal
Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, began advocating the fundamentals of
pan-Arabism. A rift soon developed, however, when some of the larger
Arab countries signed the Baghdad Pact, an alternative alliance, thereby
isolating Egypt.58 Nasser went ahead with his unification plan by merging
with the Syrian Arab Republic to form the United Arab Republic.
The U.A.R., the only modern Mideast merger to proceed with imple-
mentation of some of its policies, was recognized in the international
community as a successor state. It will be useful for analysis in that it
provides a good example of the necessary elements required for a success-
ful merger.
As it can be imagined it is very difficult and complicated to unify two
independent, functioning states. Each has its own assets, liabilities, and
established policies which represent their military, economic, and social
capabilities. The U.A.R.'s components, Egypt and Syria, were countries
with a history and culture completely independent of one another. Syria's
economy was operated by an educated merchant middle class in a free
enterprise system, which had functioned effectively for hundreds of
years. 9 At the same time, her agricultural community was run by small to
medium size landowners made up of tribesman and other minorities.6 On
the other hand, Egypt was a completely socialized dictatorial state. Nas-
ser, assuming Syria was ready for his modification process, known as
Egyptianization, began implementing socialization policies by nationaliz-
ing parts of the Syrian economic sector. Similarly, as part of his agrarian
reform, he confiscated land from the respective owners in the Syrian ter-
ritory causing great resentment. Additional Syrian resentment surfaced
when most of the top leadership positions, in the merged military, were
staffed by Egyptian Officers." Many of the conflicts were exaggerated as a
57 One of the major reasons for the creation of the Arab League was the resettling of
Palestine. It was felt that if a united stand was taken against the establishment of a Jewish
state, both from a military and diplomatic standpoint, then emigration of Jews to the area
would be halted and the British-Palestinian control would be maintained. Lenczowski,
Syria: A Crises in Arab Unity, CURRENT HISTORY 200 (April, 1962).
" The states which joined the Baghdad Pact were Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Great Britain,
and Turkey, Ateyo, Arab Politics and Pacts, CURRENT HISTORY 339 (June, 1956).
'9 Syria: A Revolt at the Top, 193 NATION 239 (October 14, 1961).
60 Ellis, Can Nasser Hold Syria?, 24 REPORTER 33-35 (March 16, 1961).
"l Syria: A Revolt at the Top, supra note 59, at 242.
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result of each state having its own historical traditions which developed
into different modern day environments.2 Other examples of conflict
were: (1) Egyptians were accustomed to a lack of political freedom, while
Syrians thrived on a political structure wrought with turmoil, as different
political parties strove to attain control; (2) Egypt and Syria's culture had
different roots based on British and French rule respectively, (3) Each
state had significant minority problems which caused various weaknesses
in their overall social and political structure; and (4) a lack of a common
physical border between the two territories presented strategical
problems for the military, and also prevented the natural socialization
processes from taking place because of the limited physical contact be-
tween the peoples of both states.
By 1961 the split between the two territories was irreparable. A
group of Syrian military personnel staged a quick, but effective coup re-
taking control of the Syrian territory." Nasser made a brief attempt to
retake Syria, but quickly retreated realizing the futility of a reconcilia-
tion. Once again, varying concepts of unification resulted in an unsuccess-
ful merger.'
As the example of the U.A.R. illustrates, it is not an easy task to
merge two independent sovereigns when both parties' interests have to be
catered to equally. It is a much simpler process to acquire territory by
purchase, conquest, or annexation, because then societal changes are
strictly made to suit the acquiror's needs.
VI. APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE U.A.R.
MERGER
As stated above, upon the consensual merger of Syria and Egypt in
1958, a new government was set up comprised of an executive branch
with authority vested in President Nasser, and a single Parliament made
up of delegates from both regions. Even though the successor state was
publicly proclaimed as a single international personality, each region
maintained certain independent power."' The draftsman of the U.A.R.
Provisional Constitution realized the importance of international recogni-
tion of the new state as a unitary body. In order to assure this recogni-
tion, an attempt was made to appease the international community by
adding the contents of Article 69 into the Provisional Constitution. This
62 K. DEUTSCH, NATION BUILDING 113 (1963).
63 Lenczowski, supra note 577, at 202.
64 This Note, note 2.
" For example, there was a certain amount of economic autonomy in the two territo-
ries, only because the banking and merchant foundations of Syria were so different than
those of Egypt. It would have been physically impossible to unite the two systems in one
broad sweep without causing financial havoc to both regions.
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article stated that:
the coming into effect of the present Constitution shall not infringe upon
the provisions and clauses of the international treaties and agreements
concluded between each of Syria and Egypt, and the foreign powers.
Those treaties and agreements shall remain valid in the regional spheres
for which they were intended at the time of their inclusion according to
the rules and regulations of international law."
The international community of states was officially informed of this
policy when the Foreign Minister of the U.A.R. sent a letter to the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations, restating the above principles." The
international reaction was well represented by the U.S. government's re-
sponse to the U.A.R. The Department of State took positive notice of
Article 69 because it affirmed the international status quo by not abrogat-
ing any previous obligation the predecessor states had incurred." In addi-
tion, the United States felt that it would be unfair and a potential disad-
vantage to both original signatories of a treaty to allow the other one-half
of the new state to be bound by a treaty to which its merging partner had
been a party. The obvious solution to this situation was that once the
union was achieved, the successor state would sit down and renegotiate
the treaty on terms which encompassed the whole state or which com-
pletely terminated the agreement. Although it was not expressly set forth
in the Provisional Constitution, this policy was applied to both multilat-
eral and bilateral agreements."
Subsequent to the letter sent to the Secretary General regarding
treaty rights came a letter officially informing the U.N. of the will of the
Egyptian and Syrian peoples to unite, and declaring the U.A.R. as a sin-
gle member of the U.N. bound by its charter.70 The whole procedure of
membership was treated by the General Assembly as a mere administra-
tive change since each of the preunion states had been original members
of the U.N. in their own right. In addition, the fact that the U.A.R. uni-
fied so gracefully, accepting all obligations of the predecessor states by
acting on a theory of continuity, helped dissipate any ill will in interna-
" Destour (constitution) art. 69 United Arab Republic Provisional Constitution, 1958,
amended 1961).
67 13 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1958) 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN 4/149, S/3976 (1958).
" 38 Dep't State Bull. 418 (1958).
6, All of the following treaties were in effect between the United States and Egypt or
Syria before the merger. They maintained their operational status during the union, and
had it lasted longer they probably would have been subjected to revision. See Civil Aviation,
Use of Payne Field, June 15, 1946, United States-Egypt, U.S.T. 363, T.I.A.S. No. 2397; see
also Informational Media Guaranty Program, March 3 - March 7, 1955, U.S.-Egypt, 6 U.S.T.
691, T.I.A.S. No. 3206; Air Transport Services Agreement, October 22, 1956, U.S.-Syrian
Arab Republic, 8 U.S.T. 673, T.I.A.S. No. 3818.
7 13 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1958) 13, U.N. Doc. S/3976, annex 11 (1958).
1981
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
tional circles.7 1
Upon dissolution of the U.A.R. in 1961, when the constituent ele-
ments returned to independent sovereign states, and the central entity
disappeared, all international obligations returned to their pre-union sta-
tus. Article 69 which provided for continuing validity of pre-union trea-
ties estopped Syria and Egypt from now denying their validity.72 In addi-
tion, the few bilateral treaties promulgated and ratified during the union
were split into two bilateral treaties; one between Syria and the foreign
state, and the other between Egypt and the foreign state.7
The reapplication of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations
in 1961, as an independent member, also was treated in an abbreviated
fashion. Premier Kouzbari, of Syria, sent a letter to the General Secretary
requesting a seat under independent status because its relationship with
Egypt had terminated. He claimed, under Article III of the United Na-
tions Charter, that Syria was an original member who continued that sta-
tus under the guise of the U.A.R., from 1958 to 1961. Since there were no
objections by member states, Syria was readmitted without formality.7 4
Since the Egyptian territory of the U.A.R. retained the merger name,
United Arab Republic, there were no adjustments to be made in its
United Nations status.
7 5
VII. CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION WITH
RESPECT TO TREATIES
The purpose of modern international law is to establish compromise
laws to which all states will adhere, thus, the -trend has been to codify
such arguments to give them enforcable substance. It is an endless task
with countless obstacles along the path, but such codification is vital in
order to overcome the indecisiveness of current customary international
law. The most serious threats to the accomplishment of this job are the
71 Under most circumstances non-members or successor states must follow the regular
procedure for admission It is a long drawn out process of acceptance by the General Assem-
bly following a recommendation from the Security Council. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 4, para.
1,2.
72 Destour (constitution) art. 69 (United Arab Republic Provisional Constitution, 1958,
amended 1961).
"I For example, the Surplus Agricultural Commodities Agreement between the United
States and the United Arab Republic signed in 1960, was renegotiated between Syria and
the U.S. following the dissolution in 1961. Surplus Agricultural Commodities Agreement,
Aug. 1, 1960, United States-United Arab Republic, 11 U.S.T. 1931, T.I.A.S. No. 4542; Agri-
cultural Commodities Agreement, November 9, 1962, United States-Syria, 13 U.S.T. 97,
T.I.A.S. No. 4944.
U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/149, 11 (1961).
76 The U.N. treated the dissolution of the U.A.R. as a quasi-secession by Syria, thereby
leaving the Egyptian portion of the state intact. 0. UDOKANG, supra note 20, at 296.
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various interests to be dealt with; Communist states versus Western bloc
states, industrialized states versus third world states, old world, estab-
lished states versus newly evolved states, and the list goes on. Because
each state protects its own interests, whether that involves preservation
of the status quo, or radical departures from present custom, the estab-
lishment of an acceptable compromise is a very precarious venture.
In 1949 the United Nations formed the International Law Commis-
sion, as a committee to investigate the idea of codifying international law
in various fields.7s In 1962, soon after the dissolution of the U.A.R., a
subcommittee was named to debate and draft a proposal of rules regard-
ing the rights and responsibilities of successive states and governments.7
The subcommittee's work was divided into subsections, one of which was
succession of states with respect to treaties.7 8 After many years of ardu-
ous debate, a final draft was completed and submitted to the Interna-
tional Law Commission.79 Upon circulation of the draft to the United Na-
tions body of states, and subsequent to solicitation of comments, the
United Nations Conference on the Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties was convened in Vienna. Finally on August 23, 1978, the draft
was adopted subject to ratification by the member states.6 0
The final draft was heavily influenced by the recent influx of third
world states into the United Nations.-These developing countries strongly
advocated self-determination, equality of states, and general non-interfer-
ence in domestic affairs.81 As d result, the negativist doctrine is utilized
throughout the document. However, one variation of this theme is found
in the relevant consensual merger section where a modified continuity
doctrine emerges. Thus, Article 31 states that any treaty in force as of the
date of unification between either of the predecessor states and a third
party continues to bind the successor state by way of ipso jure continuity,
unless: (1) the successor state and third party state agree to terminate
such agreement, or (2) the application of the treaty would be incompati-
ble with the object or purpose of uniting the two predecessor states, or (3)
the unification radically changes the operation or effects of the treaty.82
The second abrogation mechanism has undertones of the Nyerere doc-
76 U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SEC. A/1949 (1949).
7 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 32 U.N. Doc. A/5209 (1962).
70 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 24, U.N. Doc. A/7209/Rev. 1 (1969).
70 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) 9 U.N. Doc. A/8710/Rev. 1 (1972).
80 Approximately 94 member states participated in the Vienna Conference. As of Feb-
ruary 1, 1981, 20 countries were signatories, while only five states have ratified the instru-
ment. Those states are Iraq, Uruguay, Seychelles, Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia. According to
Article 49 of the Convention, upon the fifteenth state ratifying the treaty, it will enter into
force 30 days later.
8, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/8710/Rev. 1 (1972).
89 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 31.
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trine, and only time and experience will show how narrowly or broadly
this language will be construed. Due to these provisions, the issue of rec-
ognition of pre-merger treaties becomes a unilateral decision of the suc-
cessor state. If the state feels that the treaty 'violates' its new policies, the
treaty is terminated without any formal action.
An additional clause to this article states that treaties continuing in
force following unification are enforceable only in the territory of the
original state that was a party to the agreement.88 The exception to this
rule is that the successor state may notify the other treaty participant of
its desire to apply the treaty to the entire successor state and if that state
agrees to this overall assumption of the treaty, it will then be considered
binding.
In the case of multilateral treaties, if the successor state wishes to
fully incorporate the treaty, it must give important notice to the deposi-
tory of the convention." Generally, the state must look to the instrument
itself for requirements of incorporation since many multilateral agree-
ments require unanimous consent to such a request. If approval is
granted, the successor state as a whole becomes a signatory to the instru-
ment. 5 Lastly, if certain treaties are in the approval or ratification stage
at the time of the merger, the treaty in its frozen form succeeds to the
new state subject to the same stipulated rules."s
The Vienna Convention, as a whole, integrates the clean slate/nega-
tivist doctrine. But, as shown above, an °appropriate exception has been
carved out by the International Law Commission for the section on con-
sensual merger of states. One explanation for this exception is that since
the predecessor states were established functioning states prior to the
merger, it would be unfair to allow them to avoid international commit-
ments by simply creating a new entity. The predecessor states are escap-
ing from a past in which they had no control over national policymaking.
The successor state is created from a carefully negotiated combination of
two or more operating states. Thus, the successor state should be allowed
to avoid previous obligations only within the narrow exceptions estab-
lished by the Vienna Convention.
The Vienna Convention combines the U.A.R.'s Article 69 with the
Nyerere Doctrine,8 7 to produce a strong policy for continuity. However, it
contradictorially allows an escape from international liability if a particu-
83 This provision has the same effect as Article 69 of the U.A.R. Provisional Constitu-
tion. See Destour, U.A.R. Constitution, supra note 66; See also Vienna Convention, supra
note 1, at art. 31.
" Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 32, 33.
" 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) 33, U.N. Doc. A/8710/Rev. 1 (1972).
8 Vienna Convention, supra note 1.
87 U.A.R. Constitution, supra note 646; J. NYERERE, supra note 54.
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lar treaty is diametrically opposed to the new policies of the successor
state. Overall, the codification of customary international law on consen-
sual merger of states appears to have been successfully accomplished, and
done in a fair and equitable way in which the United Nations can justifia-
bly enforce. However, as is true with all actions taken by the United Na-
tions, the problem is one of practicality of enforcement. While the Con-
vention provides for sanctions against a new state which refuses to obey
international norms, most member states probably cannot agree on an
appropriate form of punishment. The bottom line with regard to interna-
tional promulgation of laws is that such laws can only be as effective as
the correlative power of enforcement.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the world progresses toward the end of the twentieth century
most of the former nineteenth century colonies have achieved indepen-
dence. As a result, although there will continue to be nationalistic strug-
gles, there will be a significant increase in attempted consensual mergers
of established states into larger regional powers. Leaders, in regions such
as the Middle East, will attempt to unify peoples with similar ideological
goals by advocating the force and power of large numbers.
Of course, in order for a merger to occur there needs to be specific
catalysts for change. Economic problems, such as food and basic necessity
shortages certainly are problems which plague even the oil rich states of
the Middle East, and make a perfect fomenting force for radical change.
Additionally, a propagandized common enemy, such as Israel and Egypt
serve as an effective rallying call for unifying under one flag.
It is the author's opinion, however, that along with the increase in
attempted mergers will come an equal amount of failures. States which
have deeply rooted domestic problems will not automatically solve them
with a gratuitous capital influx or a shipment of military hardware from a
merger candidate. The many characteristics which make up one nation
must be suitably matched to its receptor. States cannot and will not suc-
cessfully unify on the basis of common ideological goals alone.
What this all means is greater instability at the international level as
states frivolously change their international facade. With each alteration,
one must look to the ties that are maintained, or dissolved, with third
party states. Thus, is the importance of the Geneva Conference's codifica-
tion of state succession law with respect to treaties. The International
Law Commission has formulated laws which, on the basis of solicitation
of criticism and debate, are the best possible compromises for the imme-
diate future.
In a world which has the capability of destroying itself many times
over, communication and respect for established rights must be a funda-
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mental objective. The future of all nations depends on their adhering to
these efforts at codifying international law so that each state understands
its role in a balanced and stable international community.
